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The Role of New Federalism in Pennsylvania:
Does United States Supreme Court Precedent
Have Any Weight?
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 20, 1991, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down
a decision which effectively overruled prior inverse condemnation'
law in Pennsylvania.2 The supreme court did so by significantly
increasing the rights of individuals under the "takings" clause of
the Pennsylvania Constitution3 and consequently circumscribing
the scope of permissible state action. In United Artists Theater
Circuit, Inc. v City of Philadelphia,4 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that portions of Philadelphia's Historic Preservation
Act 5 unconstitutionally deprived landowners of an ownership inter-
est in their property without just compensation, in violation of Ar-
ticle I, section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.' The court's
decision that day appeared to be directly in conflict with a prior
decision of the United States Supreme Court,' and yet, the city of
Philadelphia, the losing party, had not a glimmer of hope for a
reversal on appeal.8 The action of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
1. "Inverse condemnation" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as:
An action brought by a property owner seeking just compensation for land taken for
a public use, against a government or private entity having the power of eminent
domain. It is a remedy peculiar to the property owner and is exercisable by him
where it appears that the taker of the property does not intend to bring eminent
domain proceedings.
Black's Law Dictionary 825 (West, 6th ed 1990).
2. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v City of Philadelphia, Pa , 595 A2d 6
(1991).
3. The "takings" clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads:
Nor shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law
and without just compensation being first made or secured.
Pa Const, Art I, § 10.
4. Pa , 595 A2d 6 (1991).
5. See note 89.
6. United Artists, 595 A2d at 13-14.
7. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104 (1978).
8. Under the doctrine established in Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032 (1983), dis-
cussed at note 23, the United States Supreme Court will not review a decision of a state
court holding a state statute unconstitutional so long as that decision rests upon adequate
and independent state grounds. Long, 463 US at 1041. Hope is not lost for the city of Phila-
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in United Artists reflects a growing tendency of state courts to
reach beyond the Bill of Rights of the federal constitution in pro-
tecting individual rights.9 This judicial activism, sometimes la-
belled "New Federalism," has been used increasingly by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court during the last two years. Indeed, it
appears that the litigant making a constitutional challenge based
on individual rights may well have greater chances of success
under the state constitution than its federal counterpart.
Part One of this comment traces this increased "New Federal-
ism" and its development in various states. In Part Two, the effect
of this movement in Pennsylvania is examined with a focus on the
recent supreme court cases of United Artists and Commonwealth
v Edmunds. 0 This examination helps reveal the role and benefits
of New Federalism in Pennsylvania and other states. This com-
ment concludes that New Federalism should continue to be used in
state courts for three reasons. First, it operates as an effective
check on the increasingly conservative federal judiciary. Second,
states offer a less costly forum for constitutional experimentation.
And third, state court judges are more likely to be in touch with
public perception and preferences with regard to the scope of indi-
vidual freedoms.
II. THE INCREASED USE OF FEDERALISM AND RELIANCE ON STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
During the Warren Court era," the federal judiciary was the pri-
mary protector of individual rights.' 2 The armor that federal
courts used to save individuals from the oppression of state gov-
ernments was the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 Although some mem-
bers of the Supreme Court urged a complete application of the Bill
of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, incor-
delphia, however, as rehearing before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was granted in
United Artists, 595 A2d at 6.
9. See notes 80 to 97 and accompanying text for a discussion of United Artists.
10. 526 Pa 374, 586 A2d 887 (1991).
11. The Warren Court era covers the United States Supreme Court during the tenure
of Chief Justice Earl Warren, from 1953 to 1969. For an in depth discussion of the Warren
Court see George J. Lankevich, ed, The Supreme Court in American Life, Volume 8-The
Warren Court 1953-1969 (Associated Faculty Press, 1986).
12. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv L Rev 489, 490-91 (1977).
13. The provisions of the Bill of Rights which have been held applicable to the states
are applicable through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brennan, 90
Harv L Rev at 490 (cited in note 12).
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poration was instead done on a piecemeal basis.14 By the end of
the Warren Court era, most of the protections afforded to individ-
uals in the first eight amendments had been made applicable to
the states by various Supreme Court decisions.15
For the past several years, however, the Supreme Court of the
United States has favored a more restrictive reading of the individ-
ual liberties afforded by the Bill of Rights. Beginning with the
1976 decision of Fischer v United States,16 in which the Court de-
termined that private diaries may be seized and used to help con-
vict a defendant,17 the high court has gradually eroded or limited
the protections afforded during the Warren Court era. 8 With the
recent appointments of Justices Souter and Thomas to the United
States Supreme Court and the "conservatization" of the federal ju-
diciary, one would expect this trend to continue for the next sev-
eral years.
The retrenchment of individual liberties being conducted by the
federal judiciary has not been entirely welcome at the state court
level. The federal constitution creates a "floor" below which states
may not go in restricting individual liberties. 9 State courts may,
however, go above this floor in expanding individual freedoms so
long as there is no conflict with positive federal law.20 State courts
have not been reluctant to use this power to hold that constitu-
tional minimums of the United States Supreme Court decisions
were not sufficient to meet more stringent requirements of state
constitutional law."' From 1970 to 1984, state courts handed down
over 250 opinions holding that state constitutional protection of
individual liberties was greater than that afforded by their federal
14. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 61 NYU L Rev 535,
540 (1986).
15. See Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652 (1925) (holding that the states are bound by
the constraints of the First Amendment); Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v Chicago, 166 US 226
(1897) (holding that the states are bound by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment);
Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949) (holding the states bound by the search and seizure
provisions of the Fourth Amendment); Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961) (holding the states
bound by the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335
(1963) (holding the states bound by the Sixth Amendments requirement of a right to
counsel).
16. 425 US 391 (1975).
17. Fisher, 425 US at 396.
18. See United States v Miller, 425 US 435 (1976) (no right of privacy in individual's
bank records); United States v Watson, 423 US 411 (1976) (consent for police search need
not be knowing or intelligent); Brennan, 61 NYU L Rev at 547 (cited in note 14).
19. Brennan, 61 NYU L Rev at 550 (cited in note 14).
20. Id.
21. Id at 548.
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counterparts.22 So long as these state court decisions rest expressly
on state constitutional law, they are unreviewable by the increas-
ingly conservative and perhaps sympathetic federal judiciary under
the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v Long.23
State court decisions expanding the protections of the federal
constitution have covered a broad range of individual rights.
Courts in California, Massachusetts, Washington and Pennsylva-
nia, for instance, have held that clauses in their state constitutions
go further in protecting freedom of expression than does the fed-
eral counterpart.24 Some of these attempts to expand individual
liberties have met with cloaked hostility from the Supreme
Court.2" Other members of the Court have encouraged states to de-
velop their own constitutional law.26 It seems clear, however, that
so long as state courts abide by the standard enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Michigan v Long,27 and do not attempt to cur-
tail those rights currently protected by the United States Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the state court
decisions.
22. Id.
23. 463 US 1032 (1983). Under the Supreme Court's decision in Long, federal courts
will not review a state court decision so long as the state court clearly states that its judg-
ment rests solely on an interpretation and application of state law. In a later case the Su-
preme Court showed that it did indeed mean what it said in Long. The court vacated and
remanded a decision of the Montana Supreme Court in which the state court had said,
"clearly, to permit evidence of defendant's refusal to take the breathalyzer test would vio-
late not only the United States Constitution, but also our own constitution." State v Jack-
son, 195 Mont 185, 637 P2d 1, 4 (1981), vacated sub nom, Montana v Jackson, 460 US 1030
(1983). For an in-depth discussion of the mistake committed by the Montana Supreme
Court, see Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster,
63 Tex L Rev 1095 (1985).
24. Robins v Pruneyard, 23 Cal 3d 899, 592 P2d 341, (1979), aff'd, 447 US 74 (1980);
Batchelder v Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass 83, 445 NE2d 590 (1983); Western Pa. So-
cialist Workers 1982 Campaign v Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa 23, 515 A2d
1331 (1986); Alderwood Assocs. v Washington Envir. Council, 96 Wash 2d 230, 635 P2d 108
(1981). See also Brennan, 61 NYU L Rev at 548 (cited in note 14).
25. See Florida v Casal, 462 US 637 (1983), in which Chief Justice Burger encouraged
the residents of Florida to "amend state law to insure rational law enforcement." Casal, 462
US at 639 (Burger concurring). Because the state court's decision in Casal was made solely
on state constitutional grounds, the Chief Justice was unable to effect this change himself.
Id at 638. See also Colorado v Nunez, 465 US 324, 327 (1984) (White concurring).
26. Justices Brennan and Stevens have actively counseled state courts to develop
their own state constitutional law. See, for example, Michigan v Mosley, 423 US 96, 120
(1975) (Brennan dissenting), and South Dakota v Neville, 459 US 553, 566-71 (1983) (Ste-
vens dissenting).
27. See note 23.
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III. "NEw FEDERALISM" IN THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has welcomed the challenge to
develop strong and independent state constitutional law with re-
spect to individual rights. Indeed, the state court was holding indi-
vidual freedoms to a higher standard shortly after the close of the
Warren Court in 1969.28 Cases which simply go farther than the
United States Supreme Court in granting individual protections
are numerous in Pennsylvania.29 As the federal judiciary becomes
increasingly conservative, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court seems to be showing an increased willingness to grant rights
in situations which directly conflict with the affirmative language
of opinions of the United States Supreme Court. The following two
cases illustrate this trend.
A. Commonwealth v Edmunds30
The exclusionary rule was first made applicable to state criminal
actions in Mapp v Ohio.1 In Mapp, the Supreme Court held that
evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search of an accused's
residence is inadmissible under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.32 Mapp thus cre-
ated the veritable floor below which state courts could not go in
admitting evidence seized without a warrant.
Twenty-three years after Mapp was decided, the United States
Supreme Court, responding in part to criticism of the harsh effects
of the exclusionary rule, lowered the floor created by the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Leon v United States,"3 the high court was
presented with evidence seized pursuant to a valid search war-
rant. 4 The warrant, however, was later found to be lacking in
28. One of the earliest Pennsylvania cases granting more rights under the state than
federal Constitution was Commonwealth v Hamilton, 449 Pa 297, 297 A2d 127 (1972)
(speedy trial).
29. See, for example, Commonwealth v Sell, 504 Pa 46, 470 A2d 457 (1983) (stand-
ing); Commonwealth v Henderson, 496 Pa 349, 347 A2d 387 (1981) (Miranda warnings to
juveniles); Commonwealth v DeJohn, 486 Pa 32, 403 A2d 1283 (1979) (expectation of
privacy).
30. 526 Pa 374, 586 A2d 887 (1991). For an in-depth discussion of both the facts of
Edmunds and the cases which preceded it, see Note, Commonwealth v Edmunds, 30 Du-
quesne L Rev 115 (1991).
31. 367 US 643 (1961).
32. Mapp, 367 US at 655.
33. 468 US 897 (1984).
34. Leon, 468 US at 902.
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probable cause and therefore defective.3 5 At trial, the defendants'
motion to suppress the seized evidence was granted over the gov-
ernment's objection that the officers were acting in good faith. 6
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether a "good faith" exception should be read into the exclu-
sionary rule of Mapp 7
In a majority opinion written by Justice White, 8 the Court held
that the good faith exception was an appropriate modification of
the exclusionary rule. 9 Evidence seized pursuant to a search war-
rant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate which the officers
believed at the time to be valid was therefore admissible, despite
the language of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.40 To
hold otherwise, claimed the majority in Leon, would be to punish
judges and magistrates rather than deter police misconduct, and
would therefore not further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.4'
Seven years after the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Leon, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented with a simi-
lar factual scenario. As in Leon, the defendant in Commonwealth v
Edmunds4 2 sought to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a defec-
tive search warrant. The warrant in question was alleged to be de-
fective43 due to failure of the supporting affidavit to state the time
frame in which the police informants had observed illegal activ-
35. Id at 903.
36. Id at 904.
37. Id at 905.
38. Justice White's opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist,
O'Conner and Chief Justice Burger. Id at 899.
39. Id at 925.
40. Id.
41. Id at 921. This rationale was one of the main justifications the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court used to deviate from Leon in Commonwealth v Edmunds. See note 64.
42. 526 Pa 374, 586 A2d 887 (1991).
43. The warrant was alleged defective under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 2003. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 890. Rule 2003 provides in part:
Rule 2003. Requirements for issuance.
(a) No search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one or more
affidavits sworn before the issuing authority. The issuing authority, in determining
whether probable cause has been established, may not consider any evidence outside
the affidavits.
(b) At any hearing on a motion for the return or suppression of evidence, or for sup-
pression of the fruits of evidence, obtained pursuant to a search warrant, no evidence
shall be admissible to establish probable cause other than the affidavits provided for
in paragraph (a).
PaRCrP 2003, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1989).
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ity.44 The trial court judge ruled that although the warrant was
defective under Rule 2003 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure,45 the officers had acted in good faith in seizing the evi-
dence. The trial judge therefore held that the evidence was admis-
sible under the good faith exception of Leon.46
Based in part upon the contested evidence, the defendant was
found guilty by the trial court.47 The defendant appealed to the
superior court, contending that the evidence seized under the
search warrant should have been excluded under both the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution48 and its state coun-
terpart, Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.49 The
superior court affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding that
there was "no compelling reason to deviate from the decision of
the [C]ourt in Leon.
'5 0
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the issue
presented was whether the Pennsylvania Constitution contained a
"good faith" exception similar to the one found in the Fourth
Amendment by the Leon Court.5' In the process of determining
this issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Edmunds deline-
ated a four-part method for comparing similar provisions of the
Pennsylvania and federal Constitutions. This four-part analysis
was expressly sanctioned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Edmunds for use by future litigants espousing different applica-
tions of state constitutional issues with their federal constitutional
44. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 890. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously held
that a search warrant lacking this information was inadmissible. Commonwealth v Conner,
452 Pa 333, 305 A2d 341 (1973).
45. See note 43 for the text of Rule 2003.
46. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 890.
47. Id at 888.
48. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
US Const, Amend IV.
49. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 890. This portion of the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any
persons or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor with-
out probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa Const, Art I, § 8.
50. Commonwealth v Edmunds, 373 Pa Super 384, 541 A2d 368, 372 (1988).
51. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 888.
1992 Comments 713
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counterparts. 2 The purpose of the four-part analysis is to provide
the court with the adequate and independent state grounds neces-
sary to overcome the Michigan v Long threshold .5  These four fac-
tors, as set forth in Edmunds, are:
1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision;
2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law;
3) related case-law from other states;
4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern,
and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
54
After noting that the similarity between the wording of the
Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 8 was not dispositive of
the state constitutional issue,55 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
-Edmunds examined the history of the state constitutional provi-
sion.5 6 The court began by noting that Pennsylvania had not recog-
nized an exclusionary rule until the Supreme Court's decision in
Mapp, and that early Pennsylvania cases paralleled those of the
United States Supreme Court during that period. 7 The court em-
phasized, however, that Pennsylvania and federal law parted ways
in 1973. It was at that time, according to the majority in Edmunds,
that the United States Supreme Court developed "a more meta-
morphosed view, suggesting that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule 'is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim
(but, rather) to deter future unlawful police conduct.' ",8 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, meanwhile, was increasingly holding
that Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was
designed to ensure individual privacy.5 9 The United States Su-
52. Id at 895.
53. Id. See note 23 for a discussion of the test of Michigan v Long.
54. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 895. The court in Edmunds also stated that in some cir-
cumstances it may be helpful to set forth related federal precedent as a form of guidance
rather than as binding authority. Id. The court stressed, however, that it is imperative for
Pennsylvania courts to make an "independent analysis under the Pennsylvania constitu-
tion." Id. This may have been a veiled jab at the trial court in Edmunds, which, according
to the supreme court, conducted a supplemental suppression hearing solely to establish the
good faith of the police officers under Leon. Id at 891.
55. Id. The court stated that even if the provisions were identically worded, the state
constitutional provision could be held to be more protective of individual rights. Id at 896,
citing Commonwealth v Tarbert, 517 Pa 277, 535 A2d 1035, 1038 (1987).
56. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 895. It was apparently central to the court's analysis that
Pennsylvania's search and seizure protections were adopted more than ten years prior to
those contained in the Bill of Rights. Id.
57. Id at 897.
58. Id at 898, quoting United States v Calandra, 414 US at 347 (1974) (emphasis
added by Edmunds court).
59. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 898, citing Commonwealth v Platou, 455 Pa 258, 312 A2d
Vol. 30:707
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preme Court's "reinterpretation" of the judicial philosophy sur-
rounding the exclusionary rule continued up to and included the
Leon decision, according to the majority in Edmunds, which
looked with clear disfavor upon the Leon Court's rationale.6 0
After examining the related caselaw from other states, 61 the su-
preme court in Edmunds proceeded to examine the policy consid-
erations behind the exclusionary rule, both as developed in Penn-
sylvania and as outlined by the United States Supreme Court in
Leon. The majority in Edmunds determined that the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule would nullify the requirements
of Rules 2003, 2005 and 2006 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure.2 In declining to adopt a rule which would have this
29 (1973), and Commonwealth v DeJohn, 486 Pa 32, 403 A2d 1283 (1979).
60. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 897 (emphasis in original).
61. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the following cases from other states as
having adopted the good-faith exception of Leon: Jackson v State, 291 Ark 98, 722 SW2d
831 (1987); State v Brown, 708 SW2d 140 (Mo 1986) (en banc); Mers v State, 482 NE2d 778
(Ind Ct App 1985); State v Huber, 10 Kan App 2d 560, 704 P2d 1004 (1985); Howell v
State, 60 Md App 463, 483 A2d 780 (1984); State v Martin, 487 S2d 1295 (La Ct App 3d Cir
1986). The Edmunds court noted that in many of these opinions the state court had merely
affirmed on the basis of Leon without making any further state constitutional analysis. Ed-
munds, 586 A2d at 900.
The Edmunds majority cited the following state cases as rejecting the good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule: State v Marsala, 216 Conn 150, 579 A2d 58 (1990); State v
Novembrino, 105 NJ 95, 519 A2d 820 (1987); People v Bigelow, 497 NYS2d 630, 488 NE2d
451 (1985); State v Carter, 322 NC 709, 370 SE2d 553 (1988); State v Taylor, 763 SW2d 756
(Tenn Ct App 1987); State v Grawein, 123 Wis 2d 428, 367 NW2d 816 (Ct App 1985);
People v Sundling, 153 Mich App 277, 395 NW2d 308 (1986); State v Herbst, 395 NW2d
399, 404 (Minn Ct App 1986); Mason v State, 534 A2d 242 (Del 1987) (rejecting good faith
exception as a statutory matter); Commonwealth v Upton, 394 Mass 363, 476 NE2d 548
(1985) (rejecting good faith exception as a statutory matter).
62. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 901. See note 43 for the text of Rule 2003.
Rule 2005 provides:
Contents of Search Warrant
Each search warrant shall be signed and sealed by the issuing authority and shall:
(a) Specify the date and time of issuance;
(b) Identify specifically the property to be seized;
(c) Name and describe with particularity the person or place to be searched;
(d) Direct that the search be executed within a specified period of time, not to exceed
two (20 days from the time of issuance;
(e) Direct that the warrant be served in the daytime unless otherwise authorized on
the warrant, PROVIDED THAT, for the purpose of the Rules of Chapter 2000, the
term "daytime" shall be used to mean the hours of 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.;
(f) Designate by title the judicial officer to whom the warrant shall be returned; and
(g) Certify that the issuing authority has found probable cause based upon the facts
sworn to or affirmed before the issuing authority by written affidavit(s) attached to
the warrant.
PaRCrP 2005, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1989).
Rule 2006 provides:
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effect, the majority in Edmunds gave indications of what it
thought of the Leon opinion and the opponents of New Federal-
ism, stating:
We decline to undermine the clear mandate of these provisions by slavishly
adhering to federal precedent where it diverges from two hundred years of
our own constitutional jurisprudence. 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Edmunds then went on to
attack the philosophical underpinnings of the Leon opinion, specif-
ically that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police
corruption. 4 Having rejected the main justification of the majority
in Leon for the "good faith" exception, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court went on to hold that the exception was not a part of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, notwithstanding the holding of Leon.6 5
Contents of Application for Search Warrant
Each application for a search warrant shall be by written affidavit(s) signed and
sworn to or affirmed before the issuing authority, which affidavit(s) shall:
(a) State the name and department, agency, or address of the affiant;
(b) Identify specifically the items or property to be searched for and seized;
(c) Name or describe with particularity the person or place to be searched;
(d) Identify the owner, occupant, or possessor of the place to be searched;
(e) Specify or describe the crime which has been or is being committed;
(f) Set forth specifically the facts and circumstances which form the basis for the
affiant's conclusion that there is probable cause to believe that the items or property
identified are evidence or the fruit of a crime, or are contraband, or are otherwise
unlawfully possessed or subject to seizure, and that these items or property are lo-
cated on the particular person or at the particular place described;
(g) If a "nighttime" search is requested (i.e. 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), state additional rea-
sonable cause for seeking permission to search in nighttime.
PaRCrP 2006, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1989).
63. Edmunds, 586 A2d at 903 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
64. Id at 904. In an earlier portion of its opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Edmunds employed fairly strong language in referring to the rationale of the Leon majority:
Indeed, we disagree with that Court's suggestion in Leon that we in Pennsylvania
have been employing the exclusionary rule all these years to deter police corruption.
We flatly reject this notion. We have no reason to believe that police officers or dis-
trict justices in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania do not engage in "good faith" in
carrying out their duties.
Id at 899.
65. Justice McDermott, who is properly characterized as the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's resident opponent of New Federalism, filed a dissent in Edmunds in which he
charged that the court abandoned a twenty-seven year history of a restrictive reading of the
exclusionary rule. Id at 906.
Justice Papadakos filed a concurring opinion in Edmunds, indicating that he would have
joined Justice McDermott's dissent but for the clear language of Rule 2003. Id.
716
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C. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v City of Philadelphia"6
To properly understand the impact of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's decision in United Artists, one must start with a
review of historic preservation law in the United States up to the
time of the United Artists decision. Zoning itself was held consti-
tutional by the United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid
v Amber Realty Co.67 The validity of historic preservation statutes
was not determined until much later, however, in the Supreme
Court's 1978 decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v New
York City.68
The plaintiff in Penn Central, the transportation company,
planned to build a high-rise office building above plaintiff's Grand
Central terminal in New York City.6 9 Under New York City's
Landmarks Preservations Law, Grand Central terminal had been
designated a landmark and the block which it occupied a landmark
site.70 The Landmarks Preservations Commission, which had des-
ignated Grand Central terminal as a landmark, refused to give ap-
proval to Penn Central's plans for the building due to the fact that
they would be destructive of the terminal's historic and aesthetic
features.7 1 Penn Central did not appeal the Commission's decision,
but brought a separate action in state court challenging the valid-
ity of the Landmarks Law.7 2 Penn Central argued that the
Landmarks Preservation Law was unconstitutional in that it had
operated to deprive them of their property without just compensa-
tion in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. 3
The United States Supreme Court, in a majority opinion 4 writ-
ten by Justice Brennan, held that the application of the
66. Pa , 595 A2d 6 (1991).
67. 272 US 365 (1926).
68. 438 US 104 (1978).
69. Penn Central, 438 US at 116.
70. Id at 115.
71. Id at 117.
72. Id at 119.
73. Id at 118-19. Penn Central also claimed that the law operated to deprive them of
their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at
119.
74. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Marshall,
Blackmun and Powell. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens joined a dissenting opinion
by Justice Renquist.
It is at least somewhat ironic that Justice Brennan, the champion of state constitutional
independence, wrote the majority opinion in the United States Supreme Court case that was
blatantly ignored by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in United Artists.
1992
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Landmarks Law to Grand Central terminal did not rise to the level
of a taking of Penn Central's property within the meaning of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 75 Although the Euclid decision
had only validated zoning type regulations which promoted health,
safety, morals or general welfare,7 6 the majority in Penn Central
apparently extended the permissible scope of regulation to preser-
vation of aesthetic qualities and values." The New York law was
therefore valid despite the fact that it restricted Penn Central's
future use of the property and in fact forced Penn Central to con-
tinue, ad infinitum, to operate Grand Central at a loss.7 8
The facts before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in United
Artists were strikingly similar to those of Penn Central. In 1986,
the Philadelphia Historical Commission (hereinafter "the Commis-
sion") notified the then owner of the Boyd Theater, Sameric Cor-
poration of Chestnut St., Inc., that the Commission would consider
at a public meeting the proposed designation of the Boyd Theater
as "historic. '79 After Sameric twice attempted to obtain injunc-
tions preventing the Commission from holding the hearing, a hear-
ing was held on March 25, 1987.0 The Commission voted on that
date to designate the building as historic, but the order was va-
cated and the hearing was rescheduled for April 2, 1987.81 At the
Commission's rescheduled meeting, three reasons were offered for
historic designation of the Boyd Theater: (1) the theater was an
important example of art deco architecture, (2) the theater was the
work of an important Philadelphia architectural firm, and (3) the
building as a movie palace represented an important part of both
America's and Philadelphia's cultural history. 2 Testimony in op-
75. Id at 138. '
76. Village of Euclid, 272 US at 395.
77. Penn Central, 438 US at 129. This holding is directly contrasted by the United
Artists decision. See United Artists 595 A2d at 13.
78. Penn Central, 438 US at 140 (Rehnquist dissenting).
79. United Artists, 595 A2d at 7. The Commission acted under the "Historic Build-




82. Id at 8. These reasons were advanced by one of the members of the Commission.
Another member of the Commission offered slide testimony in favor of the designation.
These two members of the Commission presented all evidence in favor of the designation
and apparently did so on the Commission's behalf to the other members of the Commission.
The supreme court indicated its skepticism of the constitutionality of this procedure in a
footnote, saying:
We are troubled by a procedure where the Commission, apparently through a desig-
nation committee, recommends properties for historic designation, provides the testi-
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position to the designation was offered by a representative of
Sameric and a member of an award-winning architectural firm.83
Following the testimony of both sides, the Commission voted to
designate Boyd Theater as historic.
8 4
Sameric appealed the Commission's designation to the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which dismissed the ap-
peal. 5 The commonwealth court affirmed the dismissal, and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted an allowance of appeal.8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written
by Justice Larsen,81 framed the United Artists issue as whether
the cost of the "laudable" goals of the Philadelphia ordinance
should be borne by all taxpayers or,could lawfully be imposed on
the owner of the property in question.88 Justice Larsen's opinion
mony and evidence in support of its designation, argues the case for historical desig-
nation through one or more of its commission members, and then decides whether the
property it recommended should be so designated. There is an obvious lack of due
process in such a procedure. The property owner, whose property rights are put in
jeopardy by the Commission's proposal of historical designation, is entitled to a neu-
tral and detached arbitrator in the first instance.
Id at 8 n 1, citing Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 US 57 (1972). Had the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decided the case on the above grounds it would have been subject to review
by the United States Supreme Court under Michigan v Long. See note 23.
83. United Artists, 595 A2d at 8. The architect, Emanuel Reider, testified that the
Theater had few of the distinguishing characteristics of an art deco building, was not known
for its art deco style, and was in fact a mediocre building. Id at 8 n 2.
84. Id at 8.
85. Id. Sameric in fact filed a suit in equity against the Commission. The common
pleas court treated the suit as an appeal of the Commission's decision under the Local
Agency Law, 2 Pa Cons Stat § 752. United Artists, 595 A2d at 8.
86. United Artists, 595 A2d at 8.
87. Justice Larsen's opinion was joined by Justices Flaherty, Zappala and Papadakos.
Justice Cappy filed a concurring opinion in which he was joined by Justice McDermott and
Chief Justice Nix.
88. Id at 10. These goals were to:
(1) preserve buildings, structures, sites and objects which are important to the educa-
tion, culture, traditions and economic values of the city;
(2) establish historic districts to assure that the character of such districts is retained
and enhanced;
(3) encourage the restoration and rehabilitation of buildings, structures, sites and ob-
jects which are designated as historic or which are located within and contribute to
the character of districts designated as historic without displacing elderly, long-term,
and other residents living within those districts;
(4) afford the City, interested persons, historical societies and organizations the op-
portunity to acquire or to arrange for the preservation of historic buildings, struc-
tures, sites and objects which are designated individually or which contribute to the
character of historic districts;
(5) strengthen the economy of the City by enhancing the City's attractiveness to tour-
ists and by stabilizing and improving property values; and,
(6) foster civic pride in the architectural, historical, cultural and educational accom-
Duquesne Law Review
first reviewed the relevant Pennsylvania constitutional provision
that, like its counterpart in the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, requires compensation for a taking of private
property for public purposes." Interestingly, however, the majority
opinion in United Artists did not cite the recently promulgated
Edmunds test 90 or conduct the analysis recommended by the ma-
jority in that case.
The United Artists court instead proceeded to determine
whether the Philadelphia ordinance operated as a "taking" within
the meaning of Article I, section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.9 1 In performing this analysis, the majority not only disre-
garded the recent Edmunds standards, but almost totally ignored
the fact that a similar provision was contained in the federal Con-
stitution.92 The only reference to the Penn Central case made by
the majority was to Justice, now Chief Justice, Rehnquist's dis-
sent.9 3 The majority in United Artists determined that the ordi-
nance did constitute a taking under the Pennsylvania Constitution
and that the Board's designation was, therefore, unconstitutional.
9 4
Interestingly, perhaps the two strongest proponents of New Feder-
alism on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Chief Justice Nix and
Justice Cappy, filed a concurring opinion in United Artists indi-
cating that Penn Central deserved more attention and that Penn-
sylvania's constitutional provision did not necessarily mandate a
different result on the takings issue25 This concurring opinion was
joined by Justice McDermott, probably the court's staunchest op-
ponent to New Federalism.9
plishments of Philadelphia.
Philadelphia Code § 14-2007.
89. Pennsylvania's constitutional provision reads in part:
Nor shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and
without just compensation being first made or secured.
Pa Const, Art I, § 10.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.
US Const, Amend V. This portion of the Fifth Amendment has been made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago B & Q R. Co. v Chicago, 166 US 226
(1897).
90. See note 54 and accompanying text.
91. See note 89 for a partial text of Pa Const, Art I, § 10.
92. The majority's lone citation to the Fifth Amendment was in footnote eight of the
court's opinion. United Artists, 595 A2d at 11 n 8.
93. Id at 13.
94. Id at 14.





As long as the federal judiciary continues to taper the freedoms
afforded during the Warren Court, New Federalism is apt to con-
tinue in various state courts in this country. As espoused by Jus-
tice Brennan97 and Chief Justice Nix, " this continued expansion
and experimentation with state-based constitutional rights should
be encouraged for several reasons.
First, New Federalism offers a foil for the well-documented con-
servatization of the federal judiciary. Twelve years of Republican
administration have created a judiciary which is not at all protec-
tive of the individual rights developed by the Warren Court. The
erosion of these protections is likely to continue for some time, no
matter which party controls the White House. New Federalism op-
erates as a check on this erosion, although concededly only at the
state government level.
Second, state court judges are more likely to be in tune to public
perception and opinion, and their opinions may therefore be more
reflective of current social values. Whereas members of the federal
judiciary receive lifetime appointments, most state court judges are
either appointed for limited terms or elected. Hence, they are more
apt to be conscious of public attitudes. To the extent that these
attitudes are in favor of greater protection of individual rights,
state court judges can continue to put these attitudes into effect
through New Federalism.
Third, experimentation with individual rights is less costly at the
state level than at the federal level. The United Artists case is an
excellent example of this. On the federal level, a holding that his-
toric designation in some cases may require compensation to the
owner of the affected property would likely immobilize the historic
movement throughout the country. State and local governments do
not have the funds necessary to effectuate such a requirement, and
the number of historic designations would be likely to significantly
dissipate. In the event that such a decision were perceived errone-
ous, the movement might well be crippled nationwide before the
decision was reversed or a constitutional amendment passed. A
state court decision, in contrast, has a much lesser impact. Any
negative repercussions are much less widespread or catastrophic,
97. Brennan, 61 NYU L Rev 535 (cited in note 14).
98. Robert Nix, "Federalism in the Twenty-First Century-Individual Liberties in




and many state constitutions can be amended much more quickly
and easily than the United States Constitution.
Finally, allowing state courts to pursue the development of their
own constitutional law encourages legal thought along various dif-
fering philosophical fronts. As Chief Justice Nix has written in his
article on the subject:
A state court is thus free from federal constraints when addressing a state
constitutional issue, and may approach such an issue as a strict construc-
tionist, a liberal-contextual interpreter, a legal realist, a critical legal studies
thinker, or a judicial activist.19
When such differing readings can be made under the relatively
consequence-free experimentation of New Federalism, they should
be encouraged as expanding the scope and intensity of legal
discourse.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the propriety of New Fed-
eralism, it is clear that the advocate is wise to consult his or her
state constitution in making an argument for protection of individ-
ual rights. It is possible, even likely, that Pennsylvania courts will
be more sympathetic to these arguments than those based on the
federal Constitution. What was once an appeal "throw in" now be-
comes the most compelling argument, that state action in some
way violated a client's state constitutional rights.
Foster A. Stewart, Jr.
99. Nix, "Federalism in the Twenty-First Century" at 65 (cited in note 98).
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